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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 In 2018, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill (“SB”) 10 with the purpose of 
reforming California’s system for bail and release from jail. The referendum is the power of 
the people to approve or reject statutes the Legislature adopts.1 Proposition 25 is a 
referendum that gives California voters the opportunity to determine the fate of SB 10, 
essentially giving voters the choice of whether California should keep the current money 
bail system, or to implement the new risk assessment system that SB 10 created. 
A YES vote eliminates cash bail in favor of pretrial risk assessment. This risk 
assessment would determine if an arrestee will be released or detained until their trial. No 
one will pay any fees for their release. 
A NO vote retains the cash bail system that was in place prior to 2018 and SB 10. 
Some people could be released without paying bail, while others would be required to pay 




A. Risk Assessment v. Cash Bail 
 
Many states have begun using risk assessments as a supplement to the system of 
cash bail including Kentucky, Arizona, New Jersey, and Utah.2 Risk assessments usually take 
the form of a Public Safety Assessment (“PSA”). These risk assessments consist of an 
algorithm that judges can use to make a determination about whether a person should be 
released or should be held in pretrial detention.3 These PSAs produce two risk scores. One 
attempts to determine the probability that an arrestee will commit another crime if 
released.4 The other attempts to determine the probability the arrestee will fail to appear at 
court.5 These PSAs consider various factors including: age, type of offense, criminal history, 
previous sentencing, and previous appearances.6 
 On the other hand, a cash bail system requires an arrestee pay some money as 
collateral, guaranteeing they will appear in court.7 If the arrestee fails to appear in court, 
the government keeps the money; if they make their appearances, the money is returned.8 
 
1 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9. 
2 ARNOLD VENTURES, PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT FAQS (“PSA 101”) 5 available at 
https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/Public-Safety-Assessment-101_190319_140124.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2020). 
3 Id. at 1. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 2. 




In most states and counties judges have broad discretion in setting the bail amount.9 In 
certain cases, the judge may choose not to fix a bail amount and instead release the 
offender on their “own recognizance.” Own recognizance is essentially an arrestee’s 
promise to return to court.10 However, when a person is unable to pay the bail, they have 
two options: remain in jail or contact a bail bondsman.11 The former option is the reason 
approximately 70 percent of the US jail population consists of pretrial detainees.12 Many 
people think the cash bail system discriminates against the poor and minorities.13 This 
perspective stems from studies that show that people who are incarcerated come from the 
poorest economic class, and that police in California arrest minorities at much higher rates 
than white arrestees.14 Further, over 63 percent of incarcerated persons in California are in 
jail because they cannot afford their bail amount.15 
 Bail Bonds companies usually provide a bond to secure a person’s release from 
prison in return for a percentage of the bail amount.16 However, when an arrestee uses a 
bondsman, their money is not returned to them when they show up in court or if their case is 
dismissed, as it typically would be if they had paid the government themselves.17 Instead, 
the bail bondsman keeps the percentage paid by the arrestee, in addition to various fee 
charges found in the terms and conditions of the bondsman’s contract.18 In exchange for a 
portion of the fee the bail bondsman charges, an insurance company underwrites the bail 
bondsman.19 However, the bail bondsman is always responsible for any losses the insurer 
may incur, so they pass these fees and payment plans onto the arrestees.20 Consequently, 
the bail bonds industry profits substantially from arrestees who cannot afford their bail.21 
 
III. THE LAW 
 
A. Current Law in California 
 
The bail system in California is similar to systems used in other states. When a 







14 How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes Poor People, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2017), 
at 2, 5, 16 https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/11/not-it-justice/how-californias-pretrial-detention-and-bail-
system-unfairly#. 
15 Id. at 17 








individual until their arraignment or release them.22 A person may be released on their own 
recognizance or on bail, making a financial guarantee that they will return to appear in 
court.23 An arraignment is the arrestee's first appearance in court, where the judge reads 
the person the charges against them and appoints them an attorney if they have not 
elected to retain an attorney themselves.24 Some arrestees are held in jail prior to 
arraignment; however, with the exception of certain violent felony charges, the California 
Constitution guarantees a right to release prior to trial under conditions that are not 
excessive.25 The bail amount is set according to a “schedule” by a judge or a magistrate.26 
The judge will set a fixed amount of bail for the arrestee to pay and will consider the safety 
of the public, the seriousness of the offense charged, the arrestee's previous criminal 
record, and the probability that they will appear in court.27 This gives the judge a 
considerable degree of discretion in setting the terms and conditions of the person’s bail 
and the judge may set an amount that they deem sufficient to ensure the safety of the 
public or victim, or to ensure that the person will appear in court.28  
 
As previously mentioned, there are two ways a person can pay their bail: they can 
either pay it on their own or with the help of a bail agent.29 If the person pays their own 
bail, it is generally returned to them when they appear in court.30 If they use a bail agent, 
they usually are required to pay a percentage of the bail to the agent, and the agent 
makes the financial guarantee to the court to pay the full bail amount if the arrestee does 
not make their appearances.31 The typical cost of using a bail bonds agent is 10 percent of 
the bail amount set by the court.32 If the arrestee misses their court date and the bail agent 
pays the bail amount, the bail agent can seek repayment from the arrestee.33 If an arrestee 
is unable to pay their bail amount on their own and is unable to pay a 10 percent fee to a 







22 LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., PROPOSITION 25 1 (Nov. 3, 2020), available at https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/2020/Prop25-
110320.pdf.  
23 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(f)(3). 
24 LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., supra note 22, at 1. 
25 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 12. 
26 LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., supra note 22, at 2. 
27 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 12. 
28 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(f)(3); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270 (2020). 











SB 10 was proposed by Senator Robert Hertzberg during the 2017–2018 legislative 
session.35 The purpose of the bill is to eliminate release on bail, create a new process for 
release before arraignment, and change the existing process for release at or after the 
arraignment hearing.36 Essentially, SB 10 aimed to eliminate money bail in favor of a risk 
assessment system for release pending trial.37 
 
SB 10 creates a new system in which each court would be required to create a 
“entity, division, or program,” called the Pretrial Assessment Services, that is tasked with 
assessing the risk level of arrestees, reporting their results, and making recommendations 
to the court for the conditions of the arrestee’s release. The court may assign its own 
employees to Pretrial Assessment Services or it could contract with a public entity, an 
adjoining county, or a regional group to perform the assessment, reporting, and 
recommendation tasks. The members of Pretrial Assessment Services would all be 
considered officers of the court and would not partake in any supervision services (like 
probation or parole).38 
 
2. Pre-arraignment Release 
 
 Under SB 10, any person arrested for most misdemeanor crimes will be booked and 
released without being taken to jail, or, if they are taken into custody, they will be released 
within 12 hours of booking with no risk assessment.39 For all other crimes, Pretrial 
Assessment Services will determine the arrestees risk of failing to appear in court and risk 
posed to public safety if released using a “validated risk assessment tool.”40 The “tool” must 
be one selected and approved by the court and Pretrial Assessment Services, and taken 
from a list provided and maintained by the Judicial Council.41 Each assessment will include 
a numeric “score” or a levels system to indicate whether the person is a “low,” “medium,” 
or “high” risk of failing to appear in court and pose a threat to public safety.42 Pretrial 
Assessment Services may also include recommendations that conditions be placed on a 
person’s release to assure public safety and the person’s return to court, but for low and 
medium risk persons, the conditions must be non-monetary.43 
 
35 SB 10, 2016 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
36 Id. 
37 California Proposition 25, Replace Cash Bail with Risk Assessments Referendum (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_25,_Replace_Cash_Bail_with_Risk_Assessments_Referendum_(2
020) (last visited Sept. 22, 2020). 
38 CAL. PENAL CODE §1320.7(g) (2020). 
39 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.8 (2020). 
40 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.9 (2020). 
41 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.7(k) (2020). 
42 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.9 (2020). 
43 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10(d) (2020). 
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Those arrested and detained that Pretrial Assessment Services finds to be “low risk” 
will be released on their own recognizance with the least restrictive non-monetary 
conditions.44 Those “medium risk” arrestees may either be released or detained. If 
released, the same conditions for their release applies as does for “low risk” persons.45 Any 
person released on their own recognizance must sign a release agreement that promises, 
among other things, that the person will appear in court, will not leave the state, and knows 
about the consequences if they violate the conditions of their release.46 Any “high risk” 
arrestee or any person who was arrested for a violent or serious felony offense will not be 
released.47  
 
3. Release at Arraignment 
 
Courts will adopt rules for “medium risk” persons that the police hold until 
arraignment, the first hearing in court in which the judge reads the charges.48 These court 
rules will allow “medium risk” arrestees to be released on own recognizance or supervised 
own recognizance.49 The rules will also be evaluated annually by the court to consider the 
impacts on public safety and the defendants’ due process rights.50 A pre-arraignment 
review may be done for those “medium risk” persons who were not eligible for immediate 
release.51 A court may either approve or decline release based on the pre-arraignment 
review, depending on if the court finds that conditions on release will ensure safety to the 
public and the person’s appearance in court.52 
 
Pretrial Assessment Services will submit to the court, for consideration at the person’s 
arraignment, information regarding the risk assessment score or level of the arrestee, the 
criminal charges against the arrestee, additional information relating to the arrestee’s risk 
to the public or risk of failure to appear in court, and their recommendation for conditions 
of release.53 The court may choose to release the person at arraignment and must apply 
the least restrictive non-monetary conditions to ensure the person will appear in court.54 The 
prosecution may request that the person remain detained until trial if they are charged with 
certain violent crimes.55 The court may find that there is no sufficient basis for detaining a 
defendant until trial and may order their release, however, those found to be “high risk” or 
those charged with violent or serious felonies must overcome a presumption that no 
 
44 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10(b) (2020). 
45 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10(c) (2020). 
46 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10(g) (2020). 
47 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10(e) (2020). 
48 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.11 (2020). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.13 (2020). 
52 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.13(e), (h) (2020). 
53 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.15 (2020). 
54 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.17 (2020). 
55 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.18 (2020). 
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condition on release will ensure safety to the public or that they will return to court.56 Most 
criminal charges that will be considered “high risk” and will be subject to a presumption 
against release include crimes of violence against another person, serious or violent 
felonies, or persons arrested while on conditional or supervised release or post-conviction.57 
C.  Path to the Ballot 
 In August 2018, California became the first state to eliminate the cash bail system 
when the Legislature enacted and then Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 10 into law.58 
Immediately after Governor Brown signed SB 10, the bail bonds industry began collecting 
signatures to reject SB 10 through a voter referendum.59 In order to qualify the referendum 
for the ballot, the proponents needed to collect signatures amounting to 5 percent of the 
votes cast in the last gubernatorial election.60 After filing the referendum, the proponents 
had 90 days to collect 365,880 signatures before November 26, 2018.61 Six days before the 
deadline, the proponents submitted 576,822 signatures.62 After a random sample count, 
over 80 percent were found to be valid, approximately 409,505 signatures, exceeding the 
number needed to qualify.63 
In January 2019, the “Referendum to Overturn a 2018 Law That Replaced Money Bail 
System with a System Based on Public Safety Risk” qualified for the November 2020 ballot.64 
This referendum became Proposition 25. If voters approve Proposition 25, SB 10 becomes 
law, eliminating cash bail in California. If voters reject the referendum, SB 10 fails, 
maintaining the status quo of cash bail. 
 
D. Referendum Changes and Purpose 
 
 Proposition 25 is a referendum that gives the people the opportunity to vote on 
whether to enact SB 10, which proposes to eliminate cash bail. Since Proposition 25 is a 
referendum, voters who support SB 10 and the elimination of cash bail should vote YES on 
the initiative, while voters who would like to retain cash bail should vote NO. 
 
56 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.20 (2020). 
57 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10(e) (2020). 
58 Vanessa Romo, California Becomes First State To End Cash Bail After 40-Year Fight, NPR (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/28/642795284/california-becomes-first-state-to-end-cash-bail. 
59 Reid Wilson, Bail Bond Industry Mobilizes Against Calif. Law Eliminating Cash Bail, HILL (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/404395-bail-bond-industry-mobilizes-against-calif-law-eliminating-cash-
bail.  
60 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9. 
61 BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 37. 
62 Id. 




A YES vote eliminates cash bail in favor of pretrial risk assessment. This risk 
assessment would determine if an arrestee would be released or detained until their trial. 
No one will pay any fees for their release. 
A NO vote retains the cash bail system. Some people could be released without 
paying bail, while others would be required to pay bail. Fees could still be collected for a 
person’s release. SB 10 would not take effect. 
 
E. Related Legislation 
 
 In 2016, Assembly Member Rob Bonta proposed Assembly Bill (“AB”) 42.65 AB 42 
was substantially similar to SB 10. It also proposed eliminating cash bail in favor of a 
pretrial risk assessment to determine whether a person arrested would be detained.66 
However, AB 42 was voted down on the Assembly floor.67 
 
 In 2017, Assembly Member Blanca Rubio proposed AB 789. AB 789 amended the 
law pertaining to release on own recognizance.68 This proposal passed the Legislature and 
was signed into law by then Governor Jerry Brown.69 This law expanded the criteria under 
which a person can be prohibited from being released on own recognizance without a 
court hearing.70 Consequently, the expanded criteria granted judges greater discretion in 
refusing to release arrestees on their own recognizance in certain circumstances.71 This 
greater discretion made it more difficult for the alleged offenders to obtain release on own 









65 Assembly Member Bonta was also a lead coauthor of SB 10. 
66 AB 42, 2016 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended May 30, 2017, but not enacted). 
67 Complete Bill History of AB 42, 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB42 (last visited Sep. 21, 
2020). 
68 AB 789, 2017 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
69 Complete Bill History of AB 789, 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB789 (last visited Oct. 3, 
2020). 
70 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1319.5 (2020). 
71 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1319.5 (2020) (requiring court hearing before a magistrate prior to release on own 
recognizance). 
72 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1319.5 (2020) (prohibiting release on own recognizance in the event an alleged 
offender fails to appear in court three times within three years). 
8 




 In the summer of 2016, Alaska enacted SB 91. SB 91 completely overhauled Alaska’s 
criminal justice system, including changes in bail, parole, and probation.73 According to a 
2018 report, since 2016, the prison population declined 4.8 percent while the prison 
admission rate increased by 11 percent from October 2017 to July 2018.74 This increase in 
prison admission was attributed to an increase in crime.75 Even though some supporters 
claimed that insufficient time passed to judge the merits of the bill, one of its sponsors 
became convinced that it was a mistake.76 Senator Mia Costello likened SB 91 to giving a 
“green light” to criminals, allowing them to feel “emboldened by this law.”77 
 
 In 2018, in response to this perceived spike in crime, Republican Michael Dunleavy 
campaigned on the platform “Make Alaska Safe Again.”78 After his election, Governor 
Dunleavy proposed and signed House Bill 49 (“HB 49”), which repealed and replaced SB 
91.79 HB 49 reclassified many of the drug and sexual offenses that SB 91 attempted to 
reclassify.80 The law also increased sentencing for felonies and misdemeanors while 
keeping the maximum sentencing lengths.81 Discretion for parole and pretrial determination 
was returned to the parole board and judge, the presumption of release was eliminated, 
and the Pretrial Services Program was retained.82 Additionally, manufacture and distribution 






73 Devin Kelly, Alaska’s criminal justice reform is achieving its goals, annual report says, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS 
(Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/crime-courts/2018/11/02/alaskas-criminal-justice-reform-is-
achieving-its-goals-annual-report-says/.  
74 ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N: 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (Nov. 1, 2018), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/arc-wordpress-client-uploads/adn/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/02093414/ACJC-
Annual-Report-2018.pdf.  
75 Kelly, supra note 73.  
76 Alan Greenblatt, After Reforming Criminal Justice, Alaska Has Second Thoughts, GOVERNING (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-alaska-criminal-justice-increasing-crime-rates.html.  
77 Id. 
78 Zachary A. Siegel, Alaska Passed Sweeping Criminal Justice Reforms. Its New Governor Just Unraveled 
Them., APPEAL (July 11, 2019), https://theappeal.org/alaska-passed-sweeping-criminal-justice-reforms-its-new-
governor-just-unraveled-them/.  







2. New York 
 
 In April 2019, New York enacted criminal reform legislation eliminating cash bail 
and pretrial detention for almost all misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies.84 However, it 
was immediately opposed by law enforcement officials for being too lax on crime and 
threatening public safety.85 After the Coronavirus pandemic caused a budget shortfall in 
2020, the Legislature enacted a budget that included modifications to the criminal justice 
reform enacted in 2019.86 These modifications expanded the list of crimes in which judges 
could employ bail and included persistent offenders in that list.87 
3. New Jersey 
In 2014, New Jersey passed Senate Bill 946 (“S946”). This law all but eliminated cash 
bail.88 In place of bail, this law allows judges to determine whether to detain an offender or 
release them based on an assessment of the risk they pose to the community.89 However, 
judges in New Jersey are empowered to detain offenders for up to 180 days after their 
indictment, unlike in New York.90 Further, judges may grant prosecutorial motions for 
revocation of release to offenders.91 
 
In 2018, the New Jersey Judiciary published a report assessing the results of this new 
law. The rate of new offenses committed by people awaiting trial increased from 12.7 
percent in 2014 to 13.7 percent in 2017.92 Court appearances decreased from 92.7 percent 
in 2014 to 89.4 percent in 2017.93 The average time defendants spent in pretrial detention 
decreased from 62.4 days in 2014 to 37.2 days in 2017.94 The report also showed that black 
arrestees experienced an average reduction of 10.3 days in pretrial detention, and white 
arrestees 5.2 days.95 
 
84 MICHAEL REMPEL & KRYSTAL RODRIGUEZ, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK: LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK CITY 1 (2019), available at 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/Bail_Reform_NY_full_0.pdf.  
85 Luis Ferré-Sadurní & Jesse McKinley, ‘We Can’t Spend What We Don’t Have’: Virus Strikes N.Y. Budget, N.Y. 
TIMES (April 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/nyregion/coronavirus-ny-state-budget.html.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Rafael A. Mangual, How New Jersey Did Bail Reform Better Than New York, MANHATTAN INST. (Jan. 12, 2020), 
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/how-new-jersey-did-bail-reform-better-than-new-york.  
89 Joe Hernandez, N.J. Officials Finally Release Data on Bail Reform. Their Conclusion? It’s Working, WHYY 
(April 2, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/n-j-officials-have-finally-released-data-on-bail-reform-their-conclusion-its-
working/.  
90 Mangual, supra note 88. 
91 Id. 
92 N.J. JUDICIARY, 2018 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 13 (2018), available at 
https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=Zp5.  
93 Id. at 14. 
94 Id. at 21.  
95 Id. at 22. Time spent in jail pretrial decreased from 42.3 to 32.0 days for black defendants and from 22.7 to 
17.5 days for white defendants. 
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The jail population declined by 5,600 for men and 600 for women from 2012 to 
2018.96 This decline included approximately 3,000 black individuals, 1,500 white individuals, 
and 1,300 Hispanic individuals.97 However, the proportion of Black prisoners remained 
constant at 54 percent of the overall population, while the proportion of white prisoners 
increased slightly from 28 to 30 percent, and the Hispanic population slightly decreased 
from 18 to 16 percent.98 The racial distribution remained constant among men, while the 
proportion of black women decreased from 44 to 34 percent, and the distribution of white 
women increased from 44 to 54 percent.99 
 
Fiscally, the criminal justice reform did not fare well. In 2018, expenses exceeded 
revenue.100 The program cost approximately $35 million, while the new court fees net 
approximately $22 million.101 According to John Donnadio, the Executive Director of the New 
Jersey Association of Counties, “the state's 21 counties are also dealing with added costs 
because prosecutors' offices have had to hire additional staff.”102 Some proponents claim 
that a diminished prison population will lead to a reduction in prison costs.103 However, the 
reduction in jail population “hasn't translated to cost savings as of yet. It may, two or three 
years down the road as jail staff shrink through attrition.”104 
 
II. DRAFTING ISSUES 
 
Proposition 25 is a referendum. This means that its aim is to overturn a law passed 
and approved by the Legislature — SB 10. Right now, SB 10 is on hold, so there is currently 
no effect on existing law. Passing the measure allows the proposed law to go into effect, 







96 Id. at 26. 
97 Id. at 27. 
98 Id. at 27.  
99 Id. at 28. 
100 Id. at 39. 
101 Maddie Hanna, What Happened When New Jersey Stopped Relying on Cash Bail, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 16, 
2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/new_jersey/new-jersey-cash-bail-risk-assessment-20180216.html. 
102 Id. 
103 Katherine Landergan, Report: Bail Reform Has Lowered Jail Population, but Program Facing ‘Funding 
Crisis’, POLITICO (April 2, 2019), https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2019/04/02/report-bail-reform-
has-lowered-jail-population-but-program-facing-funding-crisis-945756.  
104 Hanna, supra note 101. 
105 SB 10, 2016 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (amending Cal. Gov. Code § 27771; adding Cal. Penal 
Code §§ 1320.6–1320.34; repealing Cal. Penal Code §§ 1268–1320.5). 
11 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
 
A. Federal Constitution 
 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail.106 In 1951, the Supreme Court 
clarified that “[the bail] clause has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, 
but merely to provide that bail should not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to 
grant bail.”107 Further, in a separate case around the same time, the Court also declared 
that since bail is used as a means of ensuring a defendant will appear in court, any 
amount of bail set higher than reasonably necessary to fulfill that purpose is ‘excessive.’108 
In 1987, the Court made another pronouncement regarding pretrial detention and the Eight 
Amendment, holding that “nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible 
Government considerations solely to questions of flight. The only arguable substantive 
limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government's proposed conditions of release or 
detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil.”109 
 
 Since SB 10 only modifies the type of bail courts will use, by eliminating money bail 
in favor of release on recognizance, it should not cause an Eighth Amendment issue. A 
question of excessiveness in bail amount should not arise because SB 10 would eliminate 
money bail. The question of pretrial detention, which SB 10 would still allow, has been 
approved by the Supreme Court.110 
B. State Constitution  
The California Constitution guarantees a right to release prior to trial under 
conditions that are not excessive, but stipulates certain violent and serious felonies to which 
that rule does not apply.111 The language in SB 10 is consistent with the limitations in the 
California Constitution regarding which offenses are exempt from the opportunity for non-
excessive release.112 
 




The opponents of the proposition, seeking a YES vote, provide three primary 
arguments in favor of ending cash bail and replacing it with a risk assessment system: 
 
106 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
107 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952). 
108 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). 
109 U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 743, 754 (1987). 
110 Id. at 754. 
111 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
112 SB 10, 2016 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding Cal. Penal Code §§ 1320.10 (e), 1320.13(b), 
1320.20). 
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money bail is unfair and unjust; allowing money bail creates a public safety concern; and 
money bail is more expensive for taxpayers. 
 
Opponents argue that the cash bail system treats people differently based on their 
ability to pay and often is grossly disadvantageous those experiencing poverty. Because 
people with wealth have the ability to pay bail costs or bonds, they essentially can pay for 
their release and are given an advantage and opportunity that the poor are not.113 
Opponents contend that poor people are punished by having to remain in jail for extended 
periods of time awaiting their trial or arraignment dates because they are unable to pay 
for their freedom, making the application of the system unjust and unfair to those without 
the appropriate means.114 Further, because poverty often disproportionately affects people 
of color, opponents assert that the system is discriminatory in its effect.115 Opponents also 
claim that Prop 25 is predominantly supported by the predatory bail bonds industry that 
profits off of the poor and does not really have the best interest of the people in mind.116 
 
Under the new bail system, opponents argue, the safety of the public will be the 
primary concern.117 Judges’ determinations regarding whether to release people will be 
based on whether they are likely to commit another crime or flee from their court dates, 
and will not focus on how much money someone has. The risk assessment system, 
according to the opponents, will make the safety of the public the guiding principle.118 
 
Some opponents to Prop 25 also contend that the risk assessment system will result 
in cost saving to taxpayers. They argue that there are many thousands of people awaiting 
trial in jail and California taxpayers front the bill for detaining them.119 The new system 
would presumably reduce the number of pretrial detainees and lessen the jail population, 
saving taxpayers “millions every day.”120 
B. Proponents  
Proponents, seeking a NO vote on Prop 25, make many arguments against 
replacing the cash bail system with the risk assessment system proposed by SB 10. Some of 
their arguments include that: (1) the risk assessment system uses unreliable computers 
systems that will eliminate the right to bail and increase bias against minorities; (2) the use 
of the risk assessment system will result in an increased risk to public safety; and (3) the SB 
10 system will have a significant negative impact on taxpayers and the bail industry. 
 
113 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, TUESDAY NOVEMBER 3, 2020, 
at 76, available at https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2020/general/pdf/complete-vig.pdf [“NOVEMBER 2020 VOTER 
GUIDE”]. 
114 Id. 
115 Onyekwere, supra note 7.  
116 James, supra note 16.  
117 NOVEMBER 2020 VOTER GUIDE at 76. 
118 Id. 




Proponents argue that the risk assessment system would use computer algorithms 
that are unreliable and do not provide the level of fair judgment that a judge would 
have.121 The use of these kinds of computer systems could result in more burden on the court 
by requiring them to reevaluate and sometimes “overrule the computer’s decision.”122 
Moreover, proponents argue, the current bail system gives people the choice to secure their 
release by paying for it and the risk assessment system would deny them of that choice. 
Some civil rights groups argue that these computer algorithms would use profiling methods 
that would create more biased outcomes against people of color and the poor than 
already exists under the cash bail system.123 
 
Proponents also contend that the risk assessment release system would result in 
increased risk to public safety by allowing for the release of criminals immediately following 
their arrest.124 The current system, according to proponents, ensures that people accused of 
crimes will make their court appearances and be held accountable for their actions. Some 
proponents believe this risk assessment system could also result in an increased burden on 
law enforcement agencies.125 
 
Contrary to opponents’ arguments, proponents claim that the risk assessment 
release system would increase the cost to taxpayers. Local and state court costs would 
increase, according to proponents, from implementing the new system, which will impact 
the cost to taxpayers.126 The State Judiciary would bear the cost of contracting out for 
Pretrial Assessment Service employees and counties would be reimbursed for any 
outstanding expenses.127 However, some organizations have voiced concerns over the 
State’s reliability in following through on fiscal promises.128 Proponents argue that state and 
county budgets are facing historically deficient budgets resulting from the coronavirus 
pandemic, and this bill would only increase those deficits, causing taxpayers to suffer.129 
Furthermore, proponents contend that the bail bonds industry faces elimination and all bail 
 
121 Get the Facts, NO ON PROP 25, https://stopprop25.com/get-the-facts/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2020). 
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bonds agents, including small business owners, and their employees will face 
unemployment if this measure passes.130 
C. Fiscal Impact 
According to the Legislative Analyst’s Office (“LAO”), the size of the effects to state 
and local budgets is uncertain and would depend on the interpretation and implementation 
of the statute and other various factors. However, it is estimated that there would be 
increased state and local pretrial release costs, decreased county jail costs, and impacts 
on state and local tax revenues. 
 
The increase to the state and local governments would likely result from increased 
workload on pretrial risk assessment and pretrial detention hearings. These costs may be 
offset by a decrease in other areas, but ultimately, the LAO estimates increased costs in the 
mid hundreds of millions annually. However, the financial burden would be shifted from 
county budgets to the State’s General Fund as the costs will primarily be borne by the State 
Judiciary.131 However, as evidenced by Proposition 98 and education funding, the 
Legislature often finds ways to shift revenue to limit financial obligations of the General 
Fund.132 Consequently, there may be little hope that the State will follow through on its 
financial obligations to the Judiciary and local governments, which may leave the county 
budgets to bear the brunt of the costs.133 
 
Cost effects on county jails will depend on the number of people released and 
detained under the new system. There could be a substantial decrease in jail populations 
because people who normally would not have been able to pay their bail may be 
increasingly released on own recognizance. On the other hand, the new system could also 
result in an increase in jail population because people who normally would pay for their 
release may be increasingly detained. The LAO estimates that the former is more likely and 
that this will probably result in a decrease of tens of millions of dollars for county jails. 
 
The impact on state and local tax revenues is uncertain. In 2018, revenues from 
taxes on bail fees collected by insurance companies totaled $13 million.134 These revenues 
could decrease due to insurance companies no longer paying insurance taxes on bail 
bonds.135 Or tax revenues could increase because the money people would normally spend 
on bail or bonds could be spent on taxable goods. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 Proposition 25 determines whether California will implement SB 10. The aim of SB 10 
is to implement a risk assessment system to replace the existing cash bail system. The risk 
assessment system would focus on the level of risk a person poses of not appearing in 
court and to public safety. If Pretrial Assessment Services determines that a person is a 
flight risk or subject to repeat offenses, the court may choose to keep them detained until 
their arraignment or trial dates. Proponents of the referendum believe the risk assessment 
system would create a less just and fair system that would potentially subject people of 
color to worse biases, create a greater risk to public safety, and cost taxpayers more 
money. Opponents of the proposition, in favor of SB 10, think that the cash bail system 
favors the wealthy and unfairly punishes the poor and communities of color, and the risk 
assessment system would put more focus on public safety and save taxpayers money. The 
financial effects on the state and local governments is uncertain at this time, with estimates 
on cost and savings being in the tens of millions. 
 
https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/2019/190493.pdf (describing how the insurance companies paid approximately $13 
million in 2018, for insuring bonds). 
